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Summary 
This article examines the normative context of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights in dealing with evidence obtained through
human rights violations, and whether it serves its purpose. It unpacks the
concept of a norm and uses the liberal school of thought as the theoretical
framework, which informs the adoption of legal norms at the regional
level. These, in turn, provide a yardstick that is used to evaluate the
efficacy of the norms. With the aid of four normative developments
between 1992 and 2003, it evaluates the extent to which these
developments serve their purpose in dealing with evidence obtained
through human rights violations. It is argued that while the Tunis
Resolution and the Dakar Declaration have not served the purpose of
dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations, the
Robben Island Guidelines specifically dealt with evidence obtained
through torture. The adoption of the Principles can be reconciled with the
African Commission’s approach to the admission of evidence obtained
through human rights violations.
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1 Introduction 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission) is the major institutional structure of the African human
rights system. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(African Charter)1 establishes the Commission with a mandate to
promote and protect human rights.2 As an institutional structure,3 the
African Commission uses existing norms to develop jurisprudence to
guide it and state parties on human rights.4 The Commission may
formulate and lay down principles and rules designed to solve legal
problems arising out of human and peoples’ rights and fundamental
freedoms.5 It follows, therefore, that designing solutions that arise
from legal issues emanating from evidence obtained through human
rights violations is within the African Commission’s mandate. This
contribution questions the efficacy of the Commission’s normative
framework in dealing with evidence obtained through human rights
violations. In a bid to contextualise a norm, the author uses a
theoretical framework to understand the characteristics of a norm that
led to its adoption. An evaluation of the sufficiency of this normative
framework is undertaken and suggestions for reform follow. 
Before an evaluation of the normative framework on the evidence
obtained through human rights violations is made, it should be noted
that a normative framework develops in two ways: first, through the
intentional, deliberate development and its subsequent improvement
by a human rights body. For instance, the African Commission’s
decision to improve the protection of the rights of women in Africa
led to the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African
Women’s Protocol).6 Its normative framework was informed by the
intention of the African Commission to formulate a law to protect the
rights of women in Africa7 and culminated into the adoption of the
1 1520 UNTS 217, art 30.
2 As above.
3 C Heyns ‘The African regional human rights system: The African Charter’ (2003-
04) 108 Pennsylvania State Law Review 681. 
4 T Buergenthal ‘The normative and institutional evolution of international human
rights’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 723. 
5 Art 45(1)(b) African Charter; NJ Udombana ‘The African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights and the development of fair trial norms in Africa’ (2006) 6
African Human Rights Law Journal 298 305.
6 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, adopted by the 2nd ordinary session of the Assembly of the
African Union, Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6.
7 Seminar organised by the African Commission and Women in Law and
Development in Africa (WILDAF) in Lomé, Togo in 1995, https://www.repro
ductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_bp_africa.pdf
(accessed 20 April 2018). 
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Lomé Resolution to prepare a protocol on the rights of women in
Africa.8 This was followed by the adoption of the African Women’s
Protocol and, subsequently, General Comment 2 on articles 14(1)(a),
(b), (c) and (f) and articles 14(2)(a) and (c) of the Women’s Protocol.9
Second, a normative framework may develop organically through the
general improvement of other thematic concepts into a nuanced
normative framework that deals with a specific aspect of human
rights. This contribution adopts this second mode of development of
a normative framework, and engages the thematic concept of
evidence obtained through human rights violations.
The major normative developments with regard to evidence
obtained through human rights violations include the Tunis
Resolution on the Right to Recourse and a Fair Trial (Tunis
Resolution);10 the Dakar Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial in
Africa (Dakar Declaration);11 and the Guidelines and Measures for the
Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines).12 The
contribution also evaluates the Principles and Guidelines on the Right
to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (Fair Trial Principles).13
The Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-
Trial Detention in Africa 2014 (Luanda Guidelines)14 are not
employed as they are still novel and have not yet been tested by the
African Commission in the exercise of its mandate. The reasons that
inform the adoption of these norms are offered in the course of their
evaluation. It suffices to note that the normative developments were
initiated by the inadequacy of article 7 of the African Charter with
regard to the right to a fair trial.15 The study employs a desktop
research-based review and analysis of the literature on normative
frameworks. Case law and communications which offer jurisprudential
developments are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the normative
8 Lomé Resolution AHG/Res.240 (XXXI) on the Recommendation of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Prepare a Protocol on the Rights of
Women in Africa.
9 General Comment 2 on arts 14(1)(a), (b), (c) and (f) and arts 14(2)(a) and (c) of
the African Women’s Protocol adopted by the African Commission at its 55th
ordinary session held from 28 April to 12 May 2014 in Luanda, Angola.
10 Tunis Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992) Document ACHR/
Res.4 (XI) 92. 
11 Dakar Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa (1999) ACPHR/Res.41
(XXVI) 99.
12 Robben Island Guidelines; Resolution 61 (XXXII) 02 adopted by the African
Commission at its 32nd ordinary session, 17-23 October 2002.
13 Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa,
DOC/OS (XXX) 247; MA Baderin ‘Recent developments in the African regional
human rights system’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 117-118.




15 F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. A comprehensive
agenda for human dignity and sustainable development in Africa (2009) 141.
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framework. With regard to the article, effectiveness means the ability
of the normative framework as a source of soft law to deal with the
admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations,
from an interpretational perspective. The author submits that once
the interpretation of the normative framework is appreciated, the
application can be done in a manner that seeks to make the soft law
relevant to the mandate of the African Commission.
2 Conceptualising a normative framework
Various meanings may be attached to a norm, which intertwines with
the concept of a legal principle. The various definitions show that a
norm and a legal principle are synonymous. A nuanced evaluation of
the two concepts is instructive in aiding this contribution in
establishing a norm. According to Jordan, a norm is synonymous with
a legal principle or a standard upon which legal rules should be
based.16 It is imperative to establish the standard that forms the basis
of these aforementioned normative developments, who sets the
standard, and where one looks to point to this standard. Therefore,
African political, judicial and human rights issues need to be evaluated
to ascertain the standard or basis of the norms. The normative
structure, such as the Preamble and the content, is useful in
discerning the standard of the norm. However, there is no drafting
history of these developments, other than the writing up of the norms
that have been formally adopted by state parties. 
Jordan adds that a norm or a legal principle is a prevailing standard
or set of standards of behaviour or judgment assumed to be just
standards of behaviour for a society or for humanity in its entirety.17
This definition, first, points to the existence of different standards to a
legal norm. However, it is not clear whether the different standards
are evident in one particular norm, or exist across various norms.
Second, the standards are assumed to be just. This is an indication
that the justice of a given standard in a norm is an assumption which
may be proved or disproved by its application over time. It is prudent
to establish the norms that inform these assumptions. Third, the
standards or set of standards are applicable to humanity as a whole. It
should be recalled that the main challenge to the application of the
norm lies in the commitment of a state party to ensure that it is used
in the domestic jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, Joaquin and Toube state that legal norms
consist of legal rules and legal principles, which provide for
standardised forms of behaviour for subjects of the law.18 This means
that legal norms play a practical role of specifying or generalising
16 D Jordan ‘Legal principles, legal values and legal norms: Are they the same or
different’ (2010) Academicus – International Scientific Journal 109.
17 As above.
18 JR-T Muñiz ‘Legal principles and legal theory’ (1997) 10 Ratio Juris 267.
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standards to be used to justify the validity of other written sources
such as laws and subordinate legislation.19 The content that is
specified or generalised by the norm forms a basis for the future
development of the said norm. This description leads to pertinent
questions, such as whether particular concepts are specified in a
norm, the extent of their specification and what they seek to validate. 
It follows from the above analysis that the concept of a norm entails
its ability to handle a number of aspects: first, a standard or
assumption that forms the basis of the norm; who sets the standard;
and the content of the norm that points to this standard; second, the
balancing of different standards in a norm or various norms, without
conflating the spirit of the norm; third, the specification of a norm
and the extent of its specification; and, fourth, the enforceability of
the norm by human rights systems. The answers to these key points
aid in the examination of the African Commission’s mode of dealing
with evidence obtained through human rights violations. Before using
the four points to evaluate the norms, a review of the theoretical
framework aids the understanding of a norm as a concept.
3 Theoretical framework 
The international relations theory explains the emergence of norms in
international human rights law. Various schools of thought inform this
theory, such as constructivism; Marxism; idealism; realism; and
liberalism.20 Before evaluating the theory, the historical background
to the theory will aid in the appreciation of its contemporary nature.
The liberal theory has among its origins the works of Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804), who agitated for a peace programme to be
followed by states.21 Kant was of the view that the success of the
programme would rely on mutual co-operation between states as
they pursued freedoms and benefits.22 He offered four principles
which over time have aided in the development of the liberal theory.
First, he believed that the actions of the state at the international level
were a product of a focus on a domestic process. It meant that there
are various players on the domestic scene, who influence the state’s
decisions in signing treaties and adopting laws, and pointed to the
need to disaggregate the state from a unitary system to an all-
inclusive system which ensured that domestic players performed a key
role in state actions.23 
19 Jordan (n 16 above) 113. 
20 This is not a closed list of schools of thought that inform the international relations
theory. Other theories may include international political economy; feminism;
functionalism; post-modernism; post-colonialism; and hegemonic stability theory. 
21 I Kant ‘Perpetual peace: A philosophical sketch’ (1795) https://www.mtholyoke.
edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm (accessed 30 June 2018).
22 Kant (n 21 above) sec I.
23 OA Hathaway ‘Do human rights treaties make a difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale Law
Journal 1935 at 1952.
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Kant’s works were premised on the need for a democratic process.
He stated that ‘[t]he civil constitution of every state shall be
republican’.24 
Kant’s concept of ‘republican’ was understood to mean a
constitution established by a democratic process, which upheld
principles of freedom, the rule of law and equality.25 This concept has
been applied in the contemporary era as the state’s engagement with
its citizens in the running of its affairs with the purpose of achieving
peace.26 The state has to account to its citizens as the domestic
players with regard to its actions on the international scene. This
position recognises the constitution as the grand norm in a domestic
jurisdiction, which empowers its citizens to guide the state’s actions.
States, therefore, cannot be labelled as unitary entities that decide
what they want contrary to the needs of their citizens. Rather,
decisions of the state as a democratic entity are influenced by
domestic players such as political groups, interest groups, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society.27 
In the second place, Kant formed the opinion that the ‘law of the
nations shall be founded on a federation of free states’.28 This
proposition meant for states to have a uniform law that applies in
their various territories; they ought to have that uniform system of
government in the domestic territory, for example, democracy. This
uniformity would ensure that they benefit from the use of normative
principles that spoke to the nature of governments at home. It follows
that states that did not comply with this requirement were not eligible
to be members of or to be bound by this law of nations. Citing other
thinkers, such as Hugo and Grotius, who justified the existence of war,
Kant believed that war led to lawlessness that could not be attributed
to the law of states. Some writers were of the opinion that this may
mean war by states. However, it refers to tensions within states that
arise out of the failure to have meaningful engagement on issues that
affect a state in the domestic sphere.29
Third, he stated that ‘[t]he law of world citizenry shall be limited to
the condition of universal hospitality’.30 According to Kant, the
freedoms that an individual enjoyed in his domestic jurisdiction had to
be enjoyed in all domestic jurisdictions. With regard to the first
principle, the effect of this principle is that the role of the domestic
players in guiding states to action on the international scene had to
be uniform in all jurisdictions. This uniformity was recognised in the
adoption of the rules at the international level by states. This principle
24 Kant (n 21 above) sec II, first definitive article for a perpetual peace.
25 As above.
26 Hathaway (n 23 above) 1952.
27 As above.
28 Kant (n 21 above) sec II, second definitive article for a perpetual peace.
29 Hathaway (n 23 above) 1953. 
30 Kant (n 21 above) sec II, third definitive article for a perpetual peace. See
Hathaway (n 23 above) 1952.
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recognised the universality of the rights of an individual, such as the
right to a fair trial, equality, and freedom and security of the person.31
3.1 Liberal school of thought
This article limits its scope to the liberal school of thought in the
international relations theory (liberal theory), to explain the creation
of norms on the regional plane. This theory provides:32
The relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and
transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state
behaviour by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences
[and] can be restated in terms of three core assumptions. These
assumptions are appropriate foundations of any social theory of
international relations: They specify the nature of societal actors, the state,
and the international system.
The theory assumes that there has to be a relationship between the
state and its actors who usually are the government in power. On the
other hand, there are the domestic players, such as civil society, NGOs
and political or socio-economic groups. These players direct the
decisions of the state at the international level through their provision
of shadow reports to international organisations.33 They may oppose
the position of the state by enforcing their own position in that they
have a stake in the leadership of a country. This relationship leads to
the creation of a purpose in a domestic jurisdiction which provokes a
conflict between the state and domestic players. This conflict leads to
the need for co-operation on the course of action. This course of
action informs the action or the foreign policy of the state at an
international or regional level. 
The theory is informed by three principles: first, that power politics
is not the only outcome that may arise from international relations.34
Other outcomes may be decisions influenced by the domestic players.
Second, these decisions are mutual benefits, which arise out of
international co-operation. This co-operation arises out of the conflict
that arises in the domestic sphere and informs the need for co-
operation between the state and the domestic players. Third, the
domestic players shape state action and policy at the international
level.35 These three principles indicate a departure from other schools
of thought in various respects. According to the realists, the central
actors in international politics are the state actors other than the
individuals or domestic players. Second, this political system at the
31 These rights are now provided for in international and regional human rights
instruments.
32 A Moravcsik ‘Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics’
(1997) 51 International Organisation 513 516. 
33 Eg, there is a shadow report to the African Commission by Amnesty International
on Eritrea, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr64/8161/2018/en/
(accessed 21 April 2018).
34 EB Shiraev & VM Zubok International relations (2015) 78.
35 As above.
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international level implies anarchy with no recourse to a supranational
authority to enforce rules. Third, the state actors as the central players
are rational in so far as their actions maximise their self-interest.
Fourth, the existence of power held by state parties serves their self-
preservation and not the interests of the societal players.36 The
creation of any norms, therefore, is based on what the state party
wants with no regard to the interests of domestic players. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, states that the structures of
human association arise out of shared ideas other than material forces,
whether as domestic players or state actors.37 This school of thought
further states that the characteristics and interests of both parties arise
from shared ideas instead of the respective contemporary positions of
the domestic players.38 The outcome, therefore, of an international
engagement by the states is as a result of constructive and equal
engagement with various stakeholders. Norms should be created
through the concerted effort of both the domestic players and the
state. This school of thought disregards the fact that there are always
unequal players in both the domestic arena and the state.
Another school of thought is idealism, which provides that a state
should have a philosophy that guides its foreign policy and the
subsequent actions it takes as a way of providing transformation in the
domestic sphere.39 A perfect example is the policy of the United
States of America to negotiate the contents of international treaties,
yet taking a long time to sign, accede or ratify them.40 The structure
of the international relations of a state should be able to transform it
into the desired state of being. This line of thought, however, does
not consider the biases, the various shortcomings, and the negative
motives that may inform its philosophy in the creation of norms.
Therefore, with regard to the creation of norms using the liberal
theory, one needs to evaluate the formation of norms at the
international level as a result of domestic players who prevail on the
state to take action. 
3.2 Tenets of the liberal theory
The liberal theory relates to a distinct ideology that is created by the
domestic players who shape the perceptions, capacities and actions of
the state in the political, social and economic areas of a particular
state.41 It may be interpreted as an ideology propagated by domestic
36 RE Goodin ‘The state of the discipline, the discipline and the state’ in RE Goodin
(ed) The Oxford handbook of political science (2011) 8.
37 A Wendt Social theory of international politics (1999) 1.
38 As above.
39 D Markwell John Maynard Keynes and international relations: Economic paths to war
and peace (2006) 3.
40 CA Bradley ‘Unratified treaties, domestic politics, and the US Constitution’ (2007)
48 Harvard International Law Journal 307.
41 DW Michael ‘Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs’ (1983) 12 Philosophy and
Public Affairs 206. 
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players intended to influence decisions or actions or policies of a state
at an international level. Therefore, what affects the common man
forms the agenda for redress at the international level. As a result, the
theory enhances the freedoms of an individual.42 The theory assumes
that people and states seek welfare, and use reason instructively to
design strategies and institutions that are conducive to attaining this
goal.43 If a norm does not improve the welfare of the people within its
jurisdiction, then a state should not adopt it.
The first tenet provides:44
The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private
groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organise
exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under
constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations
in societal influence.
The main actors on the international political scene are individuals or
private organisations.45 These engage collectively to promote various
interests of the people within the jurisdiction of a given state party.46
Existing limitations, such as different values and differences in the
ability to guide decisions, may affect their effectiveness.47 The use of a
bottom-up approach is designed to enhance independence from
political influence. It advances interests for the common good of the
people within the state’s jurisdiction. The structures in a domestic
framework, therefore, mould state behaviour towards a common
quality of outcomes.48
The second tenet provides:49
States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic
society, on the basis of whose interests state offıcials define state
preferences and act purposively in world politics.
This provision means that the state through its actions represents the
concerns of the domestic players other than its concerns as a unitary
body. The state acts as the tool that is used to achieve the goals,
which may not otherwise be achieved by individuals at the
international level. A state adopts a declaration or a resolution for the
good of its people other than its self-preservation. Self-preservation is
contextualised as the urge by a government to cling to power
through the abuse of human rights violations, and the quelling of any
42 As above.
43 RN Lebow A cultural theory of international relations (2008) 74.
44 Moravcsik (n 32 above) 517.
45 S Haggard & BA Simmons ‘Theories of international regimes’ (1987) 41
International Organisations 491 499. 
46 As above. 
47 As above. 
48 As above.
49 Moravcsik (n 32 above) 518.
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form of resistance.50 It follows that clinging on to power as a mode of
self- preservation against the will of the masses is not for the ‘good of
the people’.51 This tenet, however, assumes that all individuals have
equal influence on state policy. The domestic players may be
composed of obscure groups that do not influence decisions like other
domestic players or state actors. For instance, a small political party or
civil society organisation may not have the force to direct state policy
as do established political parties or civil society organisations. It may
pass as a narrow pluralist perception of domestic politics, where all
individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy, but is not
always the case. More often than not the state does not represent the
views of its people equally.
The third tenet provides that ‘[t]he configuration of interdependent
state preferences determines state behaviour’.52 The behaviour or the
actions of the state are a reflection of the various patterns of state
preferences. These actions are guided by a purpose that provokes
conflict, proposes co-operation, and culminates in the adoption of
foreign policy action, which benefits the people within its
jurisdiction.53 It may be said that when a state party assents to or
ratifies or signs a treaty, its action is informed by the position of the
domestic players. Thus, the variation in the means used leads to an
expected end. The fallacy with this approach is that it may be taken to
be a reductionist one, rather than a systemic understanding between
the domestic players and the state.54
This theory is evident in various passages of the African Charter.
The Charter provides that ‘[e]very individual shall have duties towards
his family and society, the state and other legally recognised
communities and the international community’.55 This provision
recognises that an individual plays a distinct role in the affairs of his or
her family and at a subtle level in the community. The duties to the
community inform the affairs of the state or other communities at the
level of the state, such as kingdoms, and cultural institutions. The
apex of the performance of these duties is seen in the actions of the
state at the international level. This contribution, therefore, validates
the application of the liberal theory to the African Charter. In addition,
50 For more on the state’s use of self-preservation, see AL Fuller Taking the fight to the
enemy: Neo-conservatism and the age of ideology (2011) 230. Compare with
Morgenthau’s model in F Rösch Power, knowledge, and dissent in Morgenthau’s
worldview (2016) generally.
51 A detailed engagement with self-preservation and the good of the people is
beyond the scope of this article. One may consider the recent events in Zimbabwe
that illustrate that a change in the leadership of the country, despite its
constitutional ramifications, to a great extent was geared towards the good of the
people and an act of putting a stop to self-preservation by Robert Mugabe’s
government.
52 Moravcsik (n 32 above) 518.
53 Moravcsik 520.
54 Moravcsik 522.
55 Art 27(1) African Charter. 
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the individual has the duty to ‘preserve and strengthen social and
national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened’.56 This
provision mandates the individual to ensure that the state does not
threaten individual freedoms and a collective duty to agitate for state
action to improve welfare. 
The African Commission is mandated as follows with regard to the
exercise of its functions:57
To promote human and peoples’ rights and in particular … to collect
documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the
field of human and peoples’ rights, organise seminars, symposia, and
conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local
institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights, and should the
case arise, give its views or make recommendations to governments.
The provision points to the critical role that national and local
institutions play in the forging of decisions by the African
Commission. The views of these domestic players form the
Commission’s recommendations to state parties.58 This provision
points to the critical role of domestic players in forming the foreign
policy of their respective state parties at the international level. This
line of thought also forms the basis of the inclusion of the views of
civil society when monitoring a state party’s adherence to the African
Charter.
4 Use of normative developments between 1992 and 
2003
The right to a fair trial includes the question of evidence obtained
through human rights violations. This evidence, the admissibility of
which may be questioned in the course of a trial, may affect the
fairness of a trial. The literature indicates that most normative
developments on the right to a fair trial occurred between 1992 and
2003. This study scrutinises this period to establish which normative
developments point to the right to a fair trial, with an emphasis on
the mode of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights
violations. The evaluation of these developments offers insights into
whether the normative developments have dealt with evidence
obtained through human rights violations, and to what extent these
developments deal with this impugned evidence. 
According to Odinkalu, the African Union’s normative
developments on the right to a fair trial commenced in 2002.59
Odinkalu gives no justification for a retrospective review of the period
56 Art 29(4) African Charter.
57 Art 45(1)(a) African Charter.
58 Moravcsik (n 32 above) 518-522.
59 CA Odinkalu ‘Human rights mechanisms in Africa: Recent developments in their
norms, institutions and jurisprudence’ (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 105.
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before 2002 and there has been no corresponding update to his
earlier study. Banderin makes use of jurisprudential developments by
the African Commission to gauge the normative frameworks as a
basis. His insights are instructive as far as they implicitly show how the
Commission has interpreted its normative framework in developing its
jurisprudence in the communications brought before it. He analyses
three communications to show that normative frameworks underscore
the developments. The decisions in Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v
Sudan (II),60 Doebbler v Sudan61 and Purohit & Another v The Gambia62
deal respectively with the right to freedom of expression and
democracy in Africa; Islamic law and human rights in Africa; and the
human rights of mental health patients in Africa. However, they fail to
offer any insight into norms that determine evidence obtained
through human rights violations. This failure validates this research by
indicating that one has to appreciate the history and scope of a
normative framework before applying it in the development of
jurisprudence. The researcher, therefore, is justified in evaluating the
norms that may be instructive to understanding the African
Commission’s principles on evidence obtained through human rights
violations. 
According to Ouguergouz, the African Commission was aware of
the fact that article 7 of the African Charter did not adequately deal
with the right to a fair trial.63 This led to the adoption of a series of
soft law measures that could resolve this lacuna,64 such as
resolutions,65 declarations,66 legal principles67 and guidelines.68
Other authors suggest that some of the soft law adopted by the
African Commission in 2002 has not been valuable in dealing with
human rights violations such as torture.69 This failure points to a
limitation in developing jurisprudence by the Commission. Equally it
points to a poor standard or assumption that a given law seeks to
accomplish, and illustrates the need to revisit each norm to establish
the standard or assumption it stands for and how it contributes to the
normative framework of evidence obtained through human rights
violations. 
60 (2003) AHRLR 144 (ACHPR 2003). 
61 (2003) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR 2003). 
62 (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003). 
63 Ouguergouz (n 15 above) 141.
64 The relevant norms that form this soft law will be dealt with shortly.
65 Tunis Resolution (n 10 above). 
66 Dakar Declaration (n 11 above).
67 The Principles (n 13 above).
68 Dakar Declaration (n 11 above) para 3.
69 D Long & R Murray ‘Ten years of the Robben Island Guidelines and Prevention of
Torture in Africa: For what purpose?’ (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal
311.
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Mujuzi’s analysis of the African Commission’s communication of the
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of
Egypt70 is a point of departure from the foregoing literature. His
engagement with the decision shows that there has been a
progressive development of the Commission’s normative framework
with regard to evidence obtained through human rights violations.
Three milestones are evident from his analysis to show the progressive
development. First, the Tunis Declaration and the Dakar Declaration
deal with the improvement of the right to a fair trial from a general
continuum. Second, the Robben Island Guidelines deal with specific
aspects such as the non-admission of evidence obtained though
torture. Third, the Principles engage the admission of evidence
obtained through human rights violations. While his review shows a
development with regard to dealing with evidence obtained through
torture, the latter forms a small and the most egregious part of the
rights that can be susceptible to evidence obtained through human
rights violations. The researcher questions the answers that the
Principles offer with regard to its normative structure in dealing with
evidence obtained through human rights violations. Second, the
Principles show a positive normative framework that deals with
evidence obtained through human rights violations. The study notes
the lessons that are instructive for future normative developments. 
On the basis of the foregoing literature, the study narrows its focus
to four major normative developments that relate to the right to a fair
trial, with the emphasis on evidence obtained through human rights
violations. These include the Tunis Resolution;71 the Dakar
Declaration;72 the Robben Island Guidelines;73 and the Fair Trial
Principles.74 The most recent normative development with regard to
evidence obtained through human rights violations is the Guidelines
on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-Trial Detention in
Africa adopted in 2014 (Luanda Guidelines).75 The researcher is of the
opinion that it is premature to evaluate whether these guidelines have
served their purpose. A conscious decision has been made to exclude
these Guidelines from the study. However, it should be stated in the
interim that the Luanda Guidelines address some issues that are not
dealt with by the Tunis Resolution, the Dakar Declaration, the Robben
Island Guidelines and the Fair Trial Principles. First, the Luanda
Guidelines require that any evidence obtained in violation of
confidentiality of information between legal counsel and the suspect is
inadmissible.76 Second, the Luanda Guidelines emphasise that an
70 JD Mujuzi ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the
admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment: Egyptian initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab
Republic of Egypt’ (2013) 17 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 287. 
71 Tunis Resolution (n 10 above).
72 As above.
73 Robben Island Guidelines (n 12 above).
74 Luanda Guidelines (n 14 above). Banderin (n 13 above) 117-118.
75 Luanda Guidelines (n 14 above). 
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accused is informed of the right to the presence and assistance of a
lawyer or suitably-qualified paralegal before a confession is
recorded.77 This requirement extends to the accused’s enjoyment of
this right in the course of recording the confession.78 
4.1 Tunis Resolution on the Right to a Fair Trial
The Tunis Resolution was adopted by the African Commission at its
11th ordinary session in Tunis. The Commission reiterated its mandate
to promote and protect human rights according to the African
Charter and international standards.79 In addition, the Tunis
Resolution recognised the importance of the right to a fair trial under
article 7 of the African Charter, in ensuring the right to a fair trial.80
Therefore, the requirement to uphold the right to a fair trial in
international and regional law was the standard that informed the
adoption of the Resolution by state parties. This standard, however,
did not address the specific aspects relating to evidence obtained
through human rights violations. The Resolution assumed the
provision of the right to a fair trial to be a just cause, which had to be
upheld by state parties.81 This assumption, however, did not convey
justice in so far as the Resolution did not deal with evidence obtained
through human rights violations. 
The Resolution was specifically addressed to state parties to inform
persons in their jurisdiction of the remedies and the procedure
relevant thereto.82 A remedy with regard to the admission of
impugned evidence featured nowhere in the Resolution. The
Resolution required state parties to provide needy persons with legal
aid.83 The provision of legal aid did not necessarily lead to the
exclusion of evidence obtained through human rights violations. The
Resolution lacked guidance as to the extent of the available remedies,
especially with regard to evidence obtained through human rights
violations, such as the non-admission of this evidence, or the
procedure to be followed in dealing with such evidence. This failure
indicated that the standard and assumption that formed the basis of
the norm was not sufficient to ensure the right to a fair trial in
instances where there was evidence obtained through human rights
violations. The failure to address evidence obtained through human
rights violations impeded the ability of the Resolution to influence the
mode of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights
violations. However, its attempt at improving the standards of the
76 Art 8(d)(ii) Luanda Guidelines.
77 Art 9(a)(i) Luanda Guidelines.
78 Art 9(a)(ii) Luanda Guidelines. Compare with Principle N(6)(d)(1) and (2) of the
Principles.
79 Para 1 Tunis Resolution (n 10 above).
80 Paras 2-5 Tunis Resolution.
81 Paras 3 & 6 Tunis Resolution.
82 Paras 2-5 Tunis Resolution.
83 As above.
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right to a fair trial indicated that it recognised individuals and their
wellbeing as a paramount consideration.84 However, it failed to deal
with instances that spoke to the specific tendencies by state parties
that led to the admission of evidence obtained through human rights
violations. It is on this basis that one may conclude that the Tunis
Resolution did not deal with the specific aspects of the right to a fair
trial, such as evidence obtained through human rights violations. The
Tunis Resolution as part of the normative framework was effective in
improving the right to a fair trial generally. However, this effectiveness
does not speak to evidence obtained though human rights violations
in so far as it did not address instances of evidence obtained through
human rights violations. 
4.2 Dakar Declaration
Another development occurred in September 1999 culminating in the
adoption of the Dakar Declaration.85 This Declaration, which was a
product of engagements with civil society organisations, academics
and lawyers, targeted state parties. As in the case of the Tunis
Resolution, the right to a fair trial was the normative standard. With
regard to the balancing or extent of the standard of this norm the
African Commission formed the opinion that the realisation of this
right depended on four aspects. The first aspect was the elimination of
certain practices by state parties.86 These practices included state
parties’ use of acts of impunity such as the torture of suspects in pre-
trial detention. This aspect was informed by the political, social and
economic circumstances that affected the realisation of fair trials in
Africa, such as armed conflicts, massive human rights violations and
the lack of tangible methods to implement the obligations assumed
under treaties.87
In the second place, the Declaration emphasised the need for state
parties to respect the rule of law.88 This indication was instrumental in
ensuring that respect for the right to a fair trial was in an enabling
environment where the rule of law subsisted.89 The insistence by the
Declaration on the need for accountability by political institutions
offered insights into the fact that evidence obtained through human
rights violations would be challenged in courts of law. The rule of law
required the existence of fully-accountable political institutions where
84 Moravcsik (n 44 above) 517 on the primacy of the domestic society that
represents the interests of individuals in a domestic jurisdiction.
85 Dakar Declaration (n 11 above).
86 Paras 3 & 6 Dakar Declaration.
87 Para 4 Dakar Declaration.
88 Para 7 Dakar Declaration.
89 As above.
16                                                             (2018) 18 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
state parties, through their agents, did not acquire evidence obtained
through human rights violations.90 
Third, the African Commission advocated the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary.91 This independence related to the
appointment, security and tenure of the members of the judiciary,
while the impartiality related to the ability of the judiciary to hand
down decisions without the influence of any organ or person.92 This
issue ought to be distinguished from the first point above. The first
point dealt with instances before the hearing of a case, where state
parties engaged in acts that compromised a fair trial of a suspect, such
as torture. With regard to the current point, it related to the need to
guard the tenure of judicial officers to ensure that they exercised
independence in handing down decisions. The African Commission’s
advocacy of the system of appointment, tenure and removal of
judges, however, did not deal with a scenario where a state party
would have a vibrant legal regime governing the judiciary, while it
lacked rules to govern evidence that had been obtained through
human rights violations.93 As a result of this standard, the
requirement to deal with evidence obtained through human rights
violations was not directly dealt with, because the concept dealt with
the offices of the judiciary other than issues dealing with the
admission of evidence. To a small extent respect for the rule of law
provided insights into the possibility of dealing with evidence
obtained through human rights violations.
In the fourth place, the African Commission recognised that most
state parties had military courts and special tribunals that operated
alongside the institutionalised courts of judicature.94 It insisted that
although the military courts adjudicated offences of a military nature,
they had to adhere to fair trial standards.95 The special tribunals were
not expected to try offences that would be tried by the
institutionalised courts of judicature.96 
The African Commission did not pronounce itself on whether these
military courts had to use the same rules of evidence that were used in
90 This was largely limited to instances of torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading
treatment, which was a small aspect of evidence that would be obtained through
human rights violations.
91 Para 8 Dakar Declaration (n 11 above).
92 As above.
93 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 provided for a robust system in
arts 126-151 on the judiciary. It still lacks a law on evidence obtained through
human rights violations (RD Nanima ‘The legal status of evidence obtained
through human rights violations in Uganda’ (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic
Law Journal 1-38 generally). The same was evident in the Constitution of the
Republic of Kenya, 1963, which had a legal regime concerning the judiciary, but
lacked a provision on evidence obtained through human rights violations. The
same was evident in the 1980 Lancaster Constitution of Zimbabwe.
94 Para 9 Dakar Declaration (n 11 above).
95 As above.
96 As above.
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the institutionalised courts in adducing evidence. This omission
affected the enforceability of the fair trial standards that the
Declaration alluded to. This insight would have led to the realisation
of the fact that a rule on the admissibility of evidence obtained
through human rights violations would affect the trial process in all
these courts. In Uganda, for instance, the court martial adjudicates
offences that are similar to the offences in the Penal Code Act. The
question of which rules of evidence are used is not clear.97 The African
Commission’s normative stand on evidence obtained through human
rights violations remained an issue of implication rather than clarity.98 
The African Commission recognised that the bar associations, as
domestic players, were essential to the enhancement of the right to a
fair trial.99 The ability of lawyers to represent clients without
intimidation or harassment from other organs or persons was the
bedrock of the right to a fair trial.100 Even though this position is
disregarded by the realist school of thought, which that looks at the
state as a unitary body that seeks to maintain its self-preservation,101
it could be true to a given extent that bar associations played an
oversight role which might be ignored by state parties. In Law Office of
Ghazi v Sudan (I), the complainant was arrested and incarcerated as
he represented persons who were critical of the government.102 This
incident shows that the actions of the state point to its use of anarchy,
and focus on the need for self-preservation.103 In a liberal view the
lodging of complaints with the African Commission is indicative of the
consequence of a state that tries to suffocate the views of its domestic
players.104 The researcher insists that the issues dealing with evidence
obtained through human rights violations should take centre stage.
The bar associations would then act as a buffer, which would ensure
that evidence obtained through human rights violations would not be
admitted. 
The African Commission recognised the lack of effective remedies
by state parties in dealing with the right to a fair trial.105 This
recognition was a reiteration of the Commission’s use of a general
perspective in the emphasis on the general improvement of the right
97 The Uganda People’s Defence Act, 2005, which establishes the court martial, by
implication uses the same rules of evidence that govern criminal law and
procedure. See sec 217 of the Uganda People’s Defence Act.
98 The same was evident in the African Commission’s declaration in para 10 with
regard to traditional courts. While it appreciated the courts’ role in promoting
social cohesion, the Commission failed to hint at the mode of admission of
evidence.
99 Para 11 Dakar Declaration (n 11 above). Moravcsik (n 28 above) 517.
100 Para 11 Dakar Declaration. 
101 Goodin (n 36 above) 133.
102 (2003) AHRLR 134 (ACHPR 2003).
103 Goodin (n 36 above) 133. See the detailed discussion on the theoretical frame-
work above.
104 Hathaway (n 23 above) 1953.
105 Para 6. See paras 1-4 of the Tunis Resolution (n 6 above).
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to a fair trial. This position is proved through its reference to punitive,
restorative and compensatory remedies.106 The failure to take a stand
on evidence obtained through human rights violations affected the
enforcement of a rule to that effect. It would have been better if the
remedies with regard to punishment included the exclusion of
evidence obtained through human rights violations and the use of
such evidence against the perpetrators of human rights violations. The
African Commission’s desire was to have fair trial standards, whereby
state parties provided adequate protection of victims’ rights and
interests.107 This position, however, required clarity on some
procedural aspects of admitting evidence, such as subjecting the
evidence to a trial within a trial to ascertain its voluntariness. Although
the accused persons were to receive legal aid, the failure to question
the voluntariness of evidence obtained through human rights
violations meant that the accused still would suffer from the probable
use of evidence obtained in abuse of their rights. 
The Dakar Declaration did not deal directly with issues concerning
evidence obtained through human rights violations. As in the case of
the Tunis Resolution, it referred to the general component of the right
to a fair trial in terms of legal representation and independence of the
judiciary in the appointment, tenure and removal of judicial officers.
Aspects dealing with evidence obtained through human rights
violations were not dealt with. In the author’s opinion the
circumstances on the continent maintained the focus of the African
Commission on the general right to a fair trial. As a result this
normative development was inclined to those principles that affected
the right to a fair trial. This position presents the lack of oversight by
the Commission with regard to questions that would arise in dealing
with evidence obtained through human rights violations. However,
the recognition by the Declaration of the four key aspects that
affected an individual and the domestic institutions, such as the
judiciary and the bar associations, showed that their legal protection
was key to their contribution to the formation of the foreign policy of
a state party.108 It is evident that the concepts engaged under the
Dakar Declaration served the purpose of illustrating that acts of
impunity by state parties had to end, and that the independence of
the judiciary had to be protected. This effectiveness did not extend to
dealing with instances of evidence obtained though human rights
violations.
4.3 Robben Island Guidelines
The Robben Island Guidelines were adopted by the African
Commission against the backdrop that there was a need to
106 Para 13 Dakar Declaration.
107 As above.
108 Moravcsik (n 44 above) 518, on the role of domestic players on formation of a
state’s foreign policy.
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implement the various international and regional instruments with
regard to torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The
requirement to deal with torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment informs the normative standard for the Robben Island
Guidelines. 
The Preamble recalls ‘the universal condemnation and prohibition
of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment’109 and recognises ‘the need to take positive steps to
further the implementation of the existing provisions on the
prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment’.110 It is discernible from the Preamble that the Robben
Island Guidelines radically depart from the preceding legal norms that
used the right to a fair trial as the standard for implementation of the
right by embracing a mode of dealing with evidence obtained
through human rights violations. With the aid of the universal
condemnation and prohibition of torture as the standard, the Robben
Island Guidelines employ a tight standard, which relates to the
prohibition of torture, other than the general enforcement of the right
to a fair trial.111 However, this standard is inclined towards the right
against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment to the
exclusion of all other rights which would be abused in the cause of
adducing evidence. Even if the standard created a focus on evidence
obtained through human rights violations, it included only the right
against torture. This focus meant that a person whose right to the
presumption of innocence had been violated could not claim a
violation of his rights under the Robben Island Guidelines unless the
violation was related to torture.112
The generalisations in the Robben Island Guidelines relating to
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment
are addressed to state parties. The states are required to
(e)nsure that any statement obtained through the use of torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment shall not be admissible as
evidence in any proceedings except against persons accused of torture as
evidence that the statement was made.113
As such, the Robben Island Guidelines are limited to the non-
admission of evidence obtained through torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment, to the exclusion of evidence obtained
through other human rights violations. It is not in doubt that there are
109 Preamble para 1 Robben Island Guidelines (n 12 above).
110 Para 4 Robben Island Guidelines.
111 Para 7 Robben Island Guidelines.
112 Art 1 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), adopted by General Assembly
Resolution 39/46 on 10 December 1984, entered into force on 26 June 1987 ; art
5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); art 5 of the African
Charter; Communication 416/12 Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara v Cameroon, paras
81-83.
113 Robben Island Guidelines (n 12 above) Guideline 29.
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international human rights instruments that deal with torture.114 To a
great extent these instruments form a basis for the Robben Island
Guidelines.115 One may argue that the Robben Island Guidelines
reflect the content of international instruments, but its effectiveness
ought to be seen in its application as a normative instrument.116 It is
on this basis that one may conclude that these guidelines do not
provide useful direction in interpreting article 5 of the African
Charter.117 As such, there is a need for them to provide a structure to
use in dealing with torture.
Pursuant to the implementation of the regional and international
instruments on torture, the Guidelines require ‘ratification of the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’.118 This
Protocol established the African Court with a mandate to complement
the African Commission in the promotion and protection of human
rights in Africa.119 One may argue that it does not provide clarity on
the admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations.
This position is countered as far the Protocol provides that ‘[i]f the
Court finds that there has been a violation of a human or peoples’
right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation,
including the payment of fair compensation or reparation’.120 ‘In
cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid
114 UN Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 1465
UNTS 85.
115 Art 6 of the Universal Declaration, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 217
A(III) of 10 December 1948; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (1955), adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva on 30 August 1955, and
approved by the Economic and Social Council by its Resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of
31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977; art 8 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171; Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1975) adopted by General Assembly
Resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975; arts 2 and 5 of the Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of
17 December 1979; United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 1465 UNTS 85; art 1 of
the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment (1988) adopted by General Assembly Resolution 43/
173 of 9 December 1988; art 5 of the African Charter.
116 Long & Murray (n 69 above) 311.
117 As above.
118 Robben Island Guidelines (n 12 above) Guideline 1(a).
119 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc OAU/
LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) arts 1 & 2. For a discussion of the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Commission, see E Badawi ‘Draft
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Introductory
note’ (1997) 9 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 953. 
120 Art 27(1) African Court Protocol (n 119 above).
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irreparable harm to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional
measures as it deems necessary.’121
It is an indication that the orders the African Court makes are not
limited to financial reparation.122 Rather, the Protocol mandates the
Court to make ‘appropriate orders’, a requirement which is broad
enough to encompass a declaration of inadmissibility of evidence
obtained through human rights violations.123 Financial compensation
is mentioned only as an example of orders that may be made; it is not
to the exclusion of other appropriate orders as the Court may deem
fit.
The Robben Island Guidelines specify the context of the evidence
that will be dealt with, namely, evidence obtained through torture,
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The
normative standard of the need to deal with torture limits the
applicability of the guidelines beyond the violation of the right against
torture. In the second place, this limitation affects the African
Commission’s role in the development of a normative framework to
deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations, other
than torture. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Robben Island
Guidelines recognise and concretise the right to human dignity of
everyone, and that the state cannot violate the right for purposes of
self-preservation.124 The Robben Island Guidelines are effective in
ensuring that evidence obtained through torture or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment is not admissible. This effectiveness does not
extend to instances of evidence obtained through other human rights
violations. To this extent the normative framework did not serve its
purpose in as far as it did not deal with evidence obtained through all
human rights violations.
4.4 The Fair Trial Principles
The fourth major development was the passing of a resolution to
establish a working group to prepare a draft of general principles and
guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance.125 The
working groups involved in the drafting of these principles included
121 Art 27(2) African Court Protocol.
122 This formed the main type of remedy in the Tunis Resolution and the Dakar
Declaration.
123 For a discussion on appropriate orders, see G Naldi ‘Observations on the Rules of
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights
Law Journal 366 381. For reparations as a remedy, see G Naldi ‘Reparations in the
practice of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 14
Leiden Journal of International Law 681; Mtikila v Tanganyika Law Society and The
Legal and Human Rights Law Centre and Reverend Christopher Mtikila v Tanzania
App 009 & 011/2011 para 126(4) 14 June 2013.
124 Moravcsik (n 44 above) 518, on the state taking decisions for the welfare of its
citizens.
125 Resolution on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, Res AHG/
222(XXXVI); para 3 Robben Island Guidelines (n 12 above).
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academics, advocates, NGOs and other domestic players.126 This
process led to the adoption of the Fair Trial Principles.127 There are
four normative concepts in the Principles, which form the standard
that guide the African Commission’s mode of dealing with evidence
obtained through human rights violations.128 This standard is dealt
with in respect of four aspects: the right to an effective remedy;129
the role of prosecutors;130 the prohibition of the collection of
evidence through a violation of a detained suspect’s rights;131 and the
rule on how to deal with evidence obtained through force or
coercion.132 
First, with regard to an effective remedy, the Principles state:133
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent national
tribunals for acts violating the rights granted by the constitution, by law or
by the Charter, notwithstanding that the acts were committed by persons
in an official capacity. 
Further:134
Every state has an obligation to ensure that … any person whose rights
have been violated, including by persons acting in an official capacity, has
an effective remedy by a competent judicial body. 
The cumulative effect of this Principle is to widen the standard of an
effective remedy by extending it from actual or pecuniary remedies to
evidential remedies, such as the exclusion of evidence. This exclusion
includes a violation that leads to any kind of harm other than physical
harm, such as the violation of an accused’s right to the presumption
of innocence until proven guilty.135 This normative development
requires the African Commission to call on state parties to provide an
effective remedy, such as the exclusion of evidence obtained through
human rights violations, by a competent judicial body.136
Second, prosecutors have a key role to play in instances where they
have evidence that has been obtained through human right
violations. The Principles state:137
When prosecutors come into possession of evidence against suspects that
they know or believe on reasonable grounds was obtained through
recourse to unlawful methods, which constitute a grave violation of the
126 Moravcsik (n 44 above) 517, with regard to the liberal theory’s primacy on
domestic actors as key players.
127 Fair Trial Principles (n 13 above). Baderin (n 13 above) 118.
128 Fair Trial Principles (n 13 above) Preamble.
129 Principle (C)(a) Fair Trial Principles. 
130 Principle F Fair Trial Principles.
131 Principles M(7)(d)-(f) Fair Trial Principles.
132 Principle N(6)(d)(1) Fair Trial Principles.
133 Principle C(a) Fair Trial Principles. 
134 Principle C(c)(1) Fair Trial Principles. 
135 Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara v Cameroon Communication 416/12 paras 81-83.
136 Principle C(c)(1) Fair Trial Principles (n 13 above).
137 Principle F(l) Fair Trial Principles.
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suspect’s human rights, especially involving torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, or other abuses of human rights, they
shall refuse to use such evidence against anyone other than those who
used such methods, or inform the judicial body accordingly, and shall take
all necessary steps to ensure that those responsible for using such methods
are brought to justice. 
This Principle requires prosecutors to refrain from procuring the
admission of evidence which has been obtained through a violation of
a suspect’s rights unless it is being admitted to be used against
perpetrators of the human rights violations. A prosecutor exercises a
discretion to establish whether the evidence was obtained through a
disregard of rights. Once he forms the opinion that the evidence was
obtained through a violation of human rights, then, first, he should
not admit that evidence against the suspect; and, second, he should
have that evidence admitted against the perpetrator(s) of the human
rights violation.138 This Principle creates a standard which recognises
the need to deal with evidence obtained through human rights
violations and in other improper ways.139 Furthermore, it places a
significant role on prosecutors to ensure that impugned evidence is
not tendered for admission. These normative developments require
the state to desist from using its machinery to coerce people in its
jurisdiction, without being accountable to the African Commission.140
Third, the Fair Trial Principles protect suspects in the course of the
collection of evidence by the investigating arms of government. The
relevant provision states that ‘[s]states shall ensure that all persons
under any form of detention or imprisonment are treated in a humane
manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person’.141 This principle introduces distinct features that are
instructive on evidence obtained through human rights violations. A
person whose rights are infringed is still imbued with dignity. In
addition, it is indicative that the collection of evidence should use the
dignity of an individual as the yardstick. Furthermore, where the right
to human dignity is violated, then the evidence that is being obtained
may be questioned.142
Fourth, with regard to undue influence, the Fair Trial Principles deal
with evidence obtained through any other form of coercion or undue
influence. With regard to coercion, it provides:143
Any confession or other evidence obtained by any form of coercion or force
may not be admitted as evidence or considered as probative of any fact at
trial or in sentencing. Any confession obtained during incommunicado
detention shall be considered to have been obtained by coercion.
138 Mujuzi (n 70 above) 287. 
139 Principles M(7)(d) & F(l) Fair Trial Principles (n 13 above).
140 See the discussion on the liberal theory above.
141 Principle M(7)(a) Fair Trial Principles (n 13 above). See M(7)(a)-(f).
142 Nanima (n 93 above).
143 Principle N(6)(d)(1) Fair Trial Principles (n 13 above).
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It is worth noting that this provision extends the standard from
evidence obtained through human rights violations to improperly-
obtained evidence, although from the wording of the provision its
application is limited to evidence obtained through coercion or force.
Principle M(7) provides two instances where the application of the
fourth concept may be extended. The first instance is the prohibition
of taking undue advantage of a detained or imprisoned person by
compelling him or her to confess, for the purposes of incriminating
himself or herself or incriminating others.144 The second instance
where the application of the fourth concept is extended is where a
detained person is subjected to threats or methods of interrogation
which impair his or her capacity for judgment.145 These methods
relate to coercion, but the departure point is their ability to affect the
fairness of a trial without having the blemish of human rights
violations. 
The interpretation of the four concepts forms the interrelated and
interdependent normative framework on evidence obtained through
human rights violations and improperly obtained evidence. The
developments between 1995 and 1999 related generally to the right
to a fair trial, but were not specific to evidence obtained through
human rights violations. It was the normative developments, such as
the adoption of the Robben Island Guidelines (2002) and the
Principles (2003), which deal with the concept of evidence obtained
through human rights violations as an integral part of the right to a
fair trial. This development amounts to a change in the normative
developments that would be instrumental in subsequent
jurisprudential developments. A difference between the Dakar
Declaration and the Principles is that, although the former was rather
elaborate on the right to a fair trial, it missed the mark on evidence
obtained through human rights violations. The Principles to a large
extent deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations
and improperly-obtained evidence.
The Fair Trial Principles reflect two principles that are key to the
application of liberal theory. First, they protect vulnerable members of
society when their liberty has been curtailed by the state. Second,
they require that state actors, as in the case of domestic players,
should protect vulnerable members of society. This need is evident in
the requirement that prosecutors do not procure the admission of
evidence obtained through human rights violations unless the
evidence is to be used in evidence against the perpetrators of the
human rights violations. The Principles effectively dealt with evidence
obtained through all human rights violations, including evidence
illegally obtained. This was a point of departure which demonstrates a
move from slow effectiveness to a more effective framework on
evidence obtained through human rights violations. As such, the
144 Principle M(7)(d) Fair Trial Principles.
145 Principle M(7)(e) Fair Trial Principles.
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Principles deal with the general standards that illuminate
developments from the Tunis Resolution and the Dakar Declaration. In
addition, the Principles reconcile the limited application of the Robben
Island Guidelines to a more nuanced approach that embraces
evidence obtained through human rights violations.
5 Conclusion
The current normative structure was developed on the standard of the
right to a fair trial. This need arose because states were using impunity
to rule their citizens, a position that many domestic players opposed.
As such, the general development of the right to a fair trial is evident
in the failure by the Tunis Resolution and the Dakar Declaration to
deal with the admission of evidence obtained through human rights
violations. The use of civil society was geared towards other aspects of
the right to a fair trial, other than evidence obtained through human
rights violations. The normative fortunes of the African Commission
changed with the development of the Robben Island Guidelines,
which deal with this impugned evidence but limited it to evidence
obtained through torture. The Fair Trial Principles that were adopted a
year later deal with evidence obtained through human rights
violations and improperly-obtained evidence. Despite the change in
the in-depth content, the Principles were introduced at a time when
the normative framework had done little to alleviate the problem of
dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations.
It follows, if the African Commission employs liberal theory
grounded in the various articles of the African Charter, it needs to
carry out mass sensitisation and dissemination of information on the
rights under the Charter. This position should be a precursor to the
subsequent use of the views of domestic players. When domestic
players are informed, they will offer informed views to guide the
foreign policy of the respective states. The obligation to disseminate
information should be placed on states to create programmes and
legislation to support this cause. 
There should be a study on the trends of the jurisprudence of the
African Commission on evidence obtained through human rights
violations to ascertain whether this normative framework has aided or
limited its development. This demand is coupled with the fact that
since its inception, the Commission has decided on 229
communications.146 Eighty-nine of these communications have been
decided on their merits, representing 38 per cent of the total number
of communications.147 Approximately 90 communications have been
regarded as inadmissible, representing 39 per cent of the total
146 IHRDA African Human Rights Case Law Analyser; search documents http://
caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/search/?m=83 (accessed 6 November 2016).
147 As above.
26                                                             (2018) 18 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
number of communications.148 Subject to conceptual and empirical
research, the normative concepts that inform evidence obtained
through human rights violations are instructive in improving the
normative and subsequent jurisprudential developments. 
It is significant to visit the experiences of domestic, regional and
international human rights systems to draw insights as to how their
normative frameworks are developed. This study will guide future
engagements on the creation of frameworks on aspects that fall
within the mandate of the African Commission. In addition, it is a
well-acknowledged principle that domestic laws may be used to
contribute to the normative frameworks of a regional human rights
system.149 It is argued that domestic courts may guide the
Commission’s creation of a normative framework that produces clarity
on the issues that need to be addressed at the drafting stages. 
148 As above.
149 S v M 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) where the decision of the South African Supreme
Court of Appeal was instructive in the content of General Comment 1 of 2014
regarding the caregivers and the children.
